Abstract-Previously, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) detected intrusions by comparing the behaviour of the network to the pre-defined rules or pre-observed network traffic, which was expensive in terms of both cost and time. Unsupervised machine learning techniques have overcome these issues and can detect unknown and complex attacks within normal or encrypted communication without any prior knowledge. NIDS monitors bytes, packets and network flow to detect intrusions. It is nearly impossible to monitor the payload of all packets in a high-speed network. On the other hand, the content of packets does not have sufficient information to detect a complex attack. Since the rate of attacks within encrypted communication is increasing and the content of encrypted packets is not accessible to NIDS, it has been suggested to monitor network flows. As most network intrusions spread within the network very quickly, in this paper we will propose a new real-time unsupervised NIDS for detecting new and complex attacks within normal and encrypted communications. To achieve having a real-time NIDS, the proposed model should capture live network traffic from different sensors and analyse specific metrics such as number of bytes, packets, network flows, and the time explicitly and implicitly, of packets and network flows, in the different resolutions. The NIDS will flag the time slot as an anomaly if any of those metrics passes the threshold, and it will send the time slot to the first engine. The first engine clusters different layers and dimensions of the network's behaviour and correlates the outliers to purge the intrusions from normal traffic. Detecting network attacks, which produce a huge amount of network traffic (e.g. DOS, DDOS, scanning) was the aim of proposing the first engine. Analysing statistics of network flows increases the feasibility of detecting intrusions within encrypted communications. The aim of proposing the second engine is to conduct a deeper analysis and correlate the traffic and behaviour of Bots (current attackers) during DDOS attacks to find the Bot-Master.
Signature-based NIDSs monitor the behaviour of the network and compare it with the characteristics of known network attacks. The detection rate of known attacks in signature-based NIDS is high; however, it cannot detect zero-day attacks. Providing attack signatures consumes money and time, and with the increasing rate of zero-day attacks, using signature-based NIDS is not a safe solution. In anomaly-based detection techniques, the system will be trained by a sample of network traffic and adapted to the state of the network. After the training phase, the system will be suspicious of any abnormal behaviour that passes the criteria of the training sample. Using this method will increase the probability of detecting novel attacks; however, it makes lots of detection errors because of the difficulty of defining the normal state during training. Having fewer false alarms and an increased detection rate of complex attacks, especially in imbalanced network traffic, has become an important challenge in the design of detection techniques for NIDS. [1, 2] NIDS monitors the behaviour of networks by analysing bytes, packets or network flows. Based on our previous experiments and other researchers, monitoring network flows enhances the detection rate of complex attacks [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Analysing bytes or packets does not concede sufficient information about the current behaviour of machines within the network. Network flows store the important facts about the behaviour of the network, which is clearer for NIDS to analyse. On the other hand, according to [1] , network flows require 0.1 per cent of storage to be saved compared to data in the form of packets. Summarising the network data in the form of network flow enhances the speed of processing, which results in fast attack detection, and makes NIDS feasible to work in real time. For instance, in high-speed networks with an average rate of ten gigabytes per second, it is impossible for NIDS to check the content of each packet in real time. Furthermore, detecting network intrusions in real time is an important factor for NIDS, which is why the use of network flows as the input for NIDS is suggested. According to [8] : "A flow is defined as a set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a particular flow have a set of common properties."
According to [9, 10, 11] , with the growing number of attacks in encrypted communication, it has also become an important issue to detect these types of attack while a limited amount of information can be extracted from the encrypted traffic. Monitoring encrypted communication in the form of network flows enables the system to monitor the state and transitions of communication to detect attacks such as DOS or brute force, in addition to the types of attack that produce large network traffic in encrypted communication.
Currently, detecting complex attacks is one of the issues for NIDS. Since probabilistic approaches to NIDS rely only on statistics and do not correlate alarms, the rate of false alarms increases during complex attacks. On the other hand, scenario-based NIDS need to observe specific steps to detect attacks, and since complex attacks do not follow constant steps it is not suggested to apply it to NIDS [12] . According to [13] , machine learning techniques have been used in anomaly-based NIDS and enhanced the performance of attack detection. Self-learning abilities in machine learning techniques improve the detection rate of new, complex and encrypted intrusions [14, 15] .
Supervised machine learning algorithms need to be trained by a labelled data set in order to produce functions for distinguishing the normal and abnormal behaviour of the network. Semi-supervised machine learning algorithms can be trained by an attack-free unlabelled data set to formulate the normal behaviour of the network, or by a small labelled data set, which requires less effort from security experts. Nevertheless, the acquisition of labelled data from security experts, or finding an attack-free data set for both supervised and semi-supervised techniques are costly. Unsupervised machine learning techniques formulate the invisible structure of an unlabelled data set without any supervision. Clustering algorithms put objects based on their similarities into a group or groups, called clusters. Clustering algorithms have been used for unsupervised NIDS to classify the behaviour of the network and distinguish the abnormal behaviour of the network from normal traffic. [16, 17] In this paper we propose a new real-time unsupervised NIDS, which can work in normal or encrypted communications by monitoring the behaviour of network flows in two different window sizes and detect attacks by correlating outliers from the multiple clusters. The first engine has the ability to detect different types of intrusion in real-time, such as DOS, DDOS, scanning or any other type of network attack that produces a huge amount of network traffic. At the same time, the characteristics of encrypted network flows will be analysed in order to detect intrusions within encrypted traffic. Based on our previous works [18, 19, 20, 21] and other researchers [22, 23] , detecting Botnet attacks through checking the network flow only (without checking the payload of the packet) takes longer and, because of the complex structure of Botnet attacks, the NIDS needs more time to observe sufficient information. The second engine correlates the traffic of attackers (while the victim is under distributed attack) to find the similarities inside previous communications to find the eventual BotMaster.
II.RELATED WORKS
In [24] they observed the behaviours of the network by monitoring and analysing the network flows. Using network flows as input for the proposed solution reduces the computation complexity and requires fewer resources. On the other hand, they have improved the detection rate and decreased false alarms compared to the previous solutions, which analyse packets as the input for NIDS. Several solutions applied sampling to decrease the computation time for NIDS [1] ; however, sampling network traffic based on random selection increases the probability of losing important data, which leads the NIDS to produce a high false-negative error rate.
Multi-stage engines have been applied to NIDS to improve the detection rate of attack within the network [12, 25] . Analysing the behaviors of the network in several phases filters the unrequired data, improves the quality of input for NIDS, highlights the suspicious behaviour of the network and decreases the computation time for intelligent engines. In [25] they proposed multi-stage engines to filter suspicious network flows in the first stage and to send them for further analyses in the second stage. The proposed solution was not applicable for high-speed networks as the window size of the first engine was only 60 seconds and it could store and analyse 10 network flows at the same time.
Because of cost and time-consuming solutions for creating the attack signature of misuse-based NIDSs or traffic sample for anomaly-based NIDSs, several researchers applied unsupervised machine learning algorithms to NIDS. In [26] they proposed a real-time unsupervised NIDS to detect known and unknown network attacks using neural networks. They applied several neural networks to improve the detection rate of intrusions. In [27] they also proposed an unsupervised NIDS, which uses different clustering algorithms with a high detection rate.
Several solutions were proposed in [9] to detect intrusions inside encrypted communications. As suggested in [9] and proposed in [10, 11] , clustering algorithms allow the NIDS to distinguish the behaviour of networks based on statistics. Analysing network flows provides sufficient information to detect intrusion within encrypted communications. Clustering network flows is the feasible solution, for encrypted communication while the payloads of packets is not accessible to the NIDS.
There is a specific behavioural structure in communications between the Bot-Master and Bots in Botnet attacks. Based on our previous research [21] and others [22, 23] , Botnet attacks can be detected by finding the similarities between Bots and the Bot-Master. For instance, Bots regularly ping their Bot-Master to report their current status. Analysing and clustering the behaviour of Bots highlights those similarities (between other Bots) and also uniqueness (compared to other machines in the network).
III.PROPOSED SOLUTION
One of the main goals in this proposed solution is to design a real-time NIDS. To achieve this goal, several packet sniffers should be installed inside the network to aggregate the traffic and send it to the NIDS. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the proposed NIDS. After traffic aggregation, all of the duplicated packets will be filtered and synchronised based on their time stamp. Special features from the network's behaviour (based on Table 1 ) will be sent to the first engine for further analyses; in the meantime, the past hour of network traffic is stored in the database to increase the accessibility of the second engine to the previous actions inside the network, while the system needs to trace the Bot-Master during Botnet attacks. As explained below, the main reason for proposing the first engine is to detect intrusions with a small windows size and the second engine for detecting Botnet attacks. Network attacks produce a huge amount of traffic. Analysing the volume of three different metrics such as bytes, packets and network flows can highlight suspicious activity. We have applied network change measurement formula, which works based on time-series analyses to monitor those features [28] .
As mentioned in [28] 
of the network and it can detect any small changes in real time. The proposed mechanism is unsupervised (does not need any assumption) and uses less memory than previous solutions. If any of the features in Table 1 passes the threshold of network change measurement formula, the system will flag that specific time slot as an anomaly.
As shown in Table 1 , the network features will be analysed in four different resolutions: the whole network traffic and three small subnets (/0, /8, /16 and /24). Highspeed networks have vast amounts of traffic and there is a significant possibility of losing the signs of network attacks. According to [27] , network changes will be more visible while the NIDS monitors the network's behaviour in small resolution and decreases the probability of fading of attacks in normal traffic. On the other hand, according to [26] , due to having an increased rate of DOS attacks (or any other type of network attack) with spoofed IP addresses, the direct use of IP addresses is not suitable and will increase the rate of falsenegative alarms.
Apart from monitoring and analysing the volume of bytes, packets and network flows in different resolutions, it is also suggested to monitor the time implicitly of packets and network flows in small resolution. In [26] the detection rate of intrusions was enhanced by 2 per cent, while the system examines the traffic by time implicitly of the network element. Since network attacks produce a vast amount of packets or network flows, the rate of time difference between each packet (RTDP) and network flow (RTDF) will increase significantly and monitoring these parameters will improve the detection rate. While any feature from Table 1 passes the threshold of network change measurement mechanism, it will flag that time slot as an anomaly. Then the system will extract more information from the packets to finalise the structure of the network flow. As Table 2 shows, several features will be selected to create the network flow based on the protocol of the communication (IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP). According to [29] , it is suggested to define the default value of inactive network flow as 15 seconds and the default value of active timeout as 30 minutes. Extracting all the information from packets and converting it into network flows takes resources (time and process). Extracting information to complete the structure of the network flow after network change measurement mechanism decreases the computation process while the network is not under attack.
While the NIDS detects an anomaly-flagged time slot, it will cluster the traffic to distinguish normal traffic from suspicious actions. Clustering algorithms do not require any prior knowledge and they can work unsupervised. However, each clustering algorithm has its own strengths and limitations and it is impossible to find one suitable algorithm for detecting all types of intrusions within the network. To overcome this issue we have applied multi-clustering algorithms to enhance the rate of detection and decrease the error rate.
During attack, several features of network flows (Table  2) should be clustered. Clustering high-dimensional data is not suggested since the computation process will be so complex and takes a long time to process. To resolve this problem, high-dimensional data can be divided into smaller dimensions by Sub-Space clustering algorithms. Figure 2 shows an example of Sub-Space clustering, which divides the three-dimensional data set into 3 two-dimensional data sets. The next stage is to cluster all the two-dimensional data (from an anomaly-flagged time slot) with DBSCAN (density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise). DBSCAN [30] is a powerful density-based clustering algorithm, which can create clusters in any arbitrary shapes and sizes. DBSCAN will cluster the events to distinguish the normal traffic from suspicious actions and it will designate the outliers. DBSCAN works with two important parameters: minimum size of cluster (α); and acceptable distance between each point (β). The stated solution in [27] sets 'α' as 5 per cent of the network flows (number of network flows during the attack) and 'β' as the average distance (Euclidean distance) between 10 per cent of network flows (randomly selected) during the attack (from the anomaly-flagged time slot). As the detection rate in their proposed model is so high we decided to use the same amount of information; however, setting the required parameters for DBSCAN ('α', 'β') from the anomaly-flagged time slot is not suggested. According to [31] , the Mahalanobis distance considers the density of points for measuring the distance between points, whoever, It is suggested to use the Mahalanobis distance while the system needs to set 'β' for the DBSCAN. Using the Mahalanobis distance for DBSCAN enhances the accuracy rate of clusters.
Clearly, during an attack, the network is loaded with a huge amount of objects, which belong to the intrusion (packets and network flows). Sampling data to set the parameters of the intelligent engine from the anomalyflagged time slot decreases the probability of assigning an accurate value for those parameters, which leads the system to generate a high number of false alarms and a decreased detection rate.
As the proposed model saves the past hour of network traffic, it is possible to effectuate the sampling process from the previous time slot (the time slot before the anomalyflagged time slot). The NIDS will set 'α' by counting 5 per cent of network flows and 'β' by calculating the Mahalanobis distance between 10 per cent of network flows from attackfree time slot. As the density rate of the network's behaviour does not follow any specific rule, it is important to consider this factor while the system needs to measure distances between elements within the network traffic.
While the features inside Table 2 are clustered by DBSCAN, the outliers will be marked as suspicious elements. The final step is to correlate all of the suspicious network flows to highlight the similarities and repost it to administrator to identify the type of attack.
Most of the proposed models (for instance [27] ) check the number of SYN packets and label the intrusion as 'SYN flood attack' whenever the rate of SYN packets becomes high. However, according to [24] it is more accurate to find the current abnormal situation of TCP and ICMP connections using the features in Table 3 . Comparison of the features in Table 3 from previous attack-free time slot and suspicious time slot will generate more accurate and clearer report to administrator for identifying the attacks. For instance, while the number of SYN packets is high and labelled as outlier during clustering, the system will calculate the rate of AHS in normal and anomaly-flagged network traffic. Whenever the differences between AHS rate in normal and anomaly- flagged time slot becomes high, the system will suggest high probability of SYN flood attack to administrator. Clustering the different features of network flow enhances the detection rate of intrusions within encrypted communications. For instance, as mentioned in [11] , encryption does not make any significant changes in the size, number and arrival time of packets. Clustering the behaviour of the network (encrypted and normal traffic) allows the NIDS to detect any significant changes in the network and it can correlate evidence to identify the attack type.
b) Second engine:
Whenever the first engine identifies DDOS attack, it will send the details of the attackers to the second engine. The second engine is responsible for clustering the behaviour of attackers and finding similarities in the previous communication in order to find the potential Bot-Master.
As proposed in [22, 23] , one of the suitable solutions for finding the Bot-Master is to aggregate the traffic of Bots and correlate their communication before the distributed attack (DDOS, spam senders or other distributed types of attack) to determine the similarities. The Bot-Master communicates with the Bots in a particular way. For instance, the BotMaster will define a rule for Bots to send Ping requests to notify the Bot-Master about their current status. Clustering the previous traffic of current attackers allows the NIDS to find the similarities in their communication and increases the probability of detecting the Bot-Master.
Based on our previous research [21] and others [23] , one of the common methods of the Bot-Master and Bots is to use IRC protocol for their communication. In normal communication the time differences between IRC requests and replies is several seconds, while during a Botnet attack Bots reply to the request of the Bot-Master extremely quickly. Humans (normal users) need to open interface programs to work with IRC, and their response time is great while they are communicating with a server (e.g. entering simple commands by a normal user through the keyboard takes at least 2 or 3 seconds). Instead, the automated program, which is installed on Bot, will reply to the request of the Bot-Master in milliseconds. Clustering the response time of Bots and comparing it with the average length of response time in normal traffic will highlight the differences.
During distributed attacks, whenever the second engine finds similarities from the previous communication of Bots with any particular machines (Bot-Master), the system will generate a report and send it to the administrator.
IV.CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
The main goal of the proposed technique is to have realtime and unsupervised NIDS. We have found the weaknesses and limitations of current unsupervised NIDS (for instance [27] ) and apply new features (calculating the Mahalanobis distance for DBSCAN, Botnet detection engine etc.) to enhance the detection rate of network intrusions. To decrease the computation burden, the system will monitor the volume of traffic. In the event of facing significant changes in the volume of network traffic (which can be caused by network attacks), the network measurement formula will trigger the system to start the detection process. Dividing the process of detection using multi-stage engines decreases the load of the computation process. Clustering network traffic distinguishes normal traffic from outliers and detects attacks inside normal or encrypted communications. The first engine will detect attacks using a small attack-window size, such as DOS, DDOS and Scanning. It has been discovered [21, 22, 23] that the Bot-Master communicates with Bots in a same way. During distributed attacks (such as DDOS) the second engine will cluster and merge the previous actions of distributed attackers (suspicious Bots) to find the similarities of their previous connections to detect the suspicious Bot-Master.
We will implement our proposed model and test it with NSL-KDD [32] and ISCX [33] traffic sample to demonstrate the improved rate of intrusion detection on different types of network attacks such as DOS, DDOS, Botnet and etc. In the meanwhile we will create several networks (and sub networks) in a simulated environment, such as NS3 (Network Simulator 3) and connect it to public network and install our proposed model on the gateway. Afterward, we will simulate different types of network attacks to check and demonstrate the realtimeness of the proposed model. We are also undertaking research in order to propose a dynamic selftuning mechanism to suggest a more optimal size of 'α' and 'β' for the DBSCAN clustering algorithm in order to increase the rate of intrusion detection.
